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siring to comply with the law can read and obey the instruc-
tions on these posters. None of. the employees involved in
these cases appeared ignorant of the regulations.
Nevertheless the Act could be more explicit.2 7 The faults
are difficult to remedy because the Act defines active par-
ticipation in politics as the same activities that the Civil
Service Commission had determined to be prohibited when the
act took effect in 1940. A new law might well accumulate
the experiences of the last seven years into three or four
basic regulations which would obviate most of the present
uncertainty and doubt.
Many of the English speaking countries have adopted
this type of regulation, 28 an indication perhaps that the prob-
lem is inescapable in a democratic form of government. The
gigantic size of modern civil services and their infinitude of
vital contacts with all phases of national life call for serious
consideration of the subject and an orientation -of our po-
litical philosophies in terms of necessities. The decisions
discussed appear to reconcile individual freedom with the
political facts of life produced by the large scale government
of our time.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
INDIANA GROSS INCOME TAX AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Indiana Gross Income Tax Division has set forth
the following 'prerequisites' to tax exemption under the Com-
merce Clause; (1) Income derived from transactions with
customers who are non-residents of Indiana, and that (2)
by reason of the receipt of a prior order, (3) delivery was
required and made, and that (4) such delivery across states
lines was necessary and essential to the consummation of the
transaction. Ind. Gross Income Tax Div., Departmental mem-
orandum, January 24, 1947.
This ruling was issued as a result of the recent Supreme
Court decision in Freeman v. Hewit,' which held the Ind.
27. E.g. section 15 of the Hatch Act enacts into law all the previous
rulings of the Commission which are thus not subject to broad
changes.
28. Leonard D. White, "Civil Service in the Modern State" (1930).
1. 67 S. Ct. 274 (1946). Rutledge, J., concurring at 280; Douglas
and Murphy, J.J., dissenting at 292; Black, J., dissenting without
opinion. The rationale of the majority opinion by Mr. Justice
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Gross Income tax 2 invalid as applied to a sale of securities
upon the New York Stock Exchange.3  Although the mem-
orandum is ostensibly addressed to security transactions, the
test set forth therein purports to be that previously utilized
for tangible transactions. It is, therefore, applicable to all
transactions involving an Indiana seller where the sale has
extra-state factors. Inasmuch as it represents the Gross In-
come Tax Division's interpretation of the effect of the Com-
merce Clause upon such transactions it is proposed to analyze
these 'prerequisites' and discuss their applicability in those
situations where Indiana is the Seller state.
The ruling limits the Freeman case to its holding that,
for Commerce Clause purposes, transactions in intangibles
and tangibles are to be treated alike. All other points of the
ruling are derived from prior cases.4 It should be noted that
Frankfurter is that the gross income tax here applied is a tax
"on the sale" and as such is invalid. The implications of the Free-
man case on the word formula used by the Supreme Court in val-
idating or striking down state regulation is without the scope of
this note. This subject has proven a fertile field for constitutional
law writers. For analysis of the historical and current formula,
see, inter alia; Frankfurter, "The Commerce Clause" (1937); Gavit,
"The Commerce Clause" (1932) cc. 5, 6, 13; Willis, "Constitutional
Law' (1936) c. 11; Dunham, "Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate
Transactions" (1947) 47 Col. L. Rev. 211; Morrison, "State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Commerce" (1942) 36 l. L. Rev. 726; Powell,
"New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes" (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev.
909; Dowling, "Interstate Commerce and State Power" (1940) 27
Va. L. Rev. 1; Lockhart, "The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce"
(1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 617; Perkins, "The Sales Tax and Trans-
actions in Interstate Commerce" (1934) 12 N.C.L. Rev. 99.
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Repl.) §64-2601 et seq., see Dunham,
"Taxation" (1946) 21 Ind. L. J. 113, 137.
3. Appellant, trustee of an estate created by the will of an Indiana
resident, sold certain securities of the estate. The securities were
offered, at prices specified by the trustee, through an Indiana broker
and sold on the New York Stock Exchange. Appellant paid, under
protest, the Indiana Gross Income Tax based upon the proceeds
of the sale. In this action he sought a refund claiming the trans-
action was immune from tax under the Commerce Clause. The
Supreme Court of Indiana sustained the imposition of the tax [221
Ind. 675, 51 N.E.(2d) 6 (1943)]. Reversed upon appeal to U.S.
Supreme Court. (1) Intangibles are to be accorded the same pro-
tection under the Commerce Clause as tangibles, and (2) the tax
is a direct tax upon an interstate sale and is unconstitutional in
its application [67 S.Ct. 274 (1946)].
4. "The Court in its opinion cited with approval previous decisions
rendered under the Gross Income Tax Law in the case of Adams
Manufacturing Company v. Storen, the Internatiofial Harvester
Company v. Department of Treasury and other cases. The Su-
preme Court of the United States had also previously affirmed
the Allied Mills Company Inc. v. Department of Treasury case.
Since the Court in its present decision places the sale of securities
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the individual 'prerequisites' are enumerated in the conjunc-
tive and therefore, the absence of any one of these essentials
apparently results in no tax immunity. It is doubtful that
they have such broad and forceful application as the ruling
suggests.5
The applicability of these 'prerequisites', in Seller. state
transactions can best be approached by an analysis of their
possible meanings6 together with a brief summary of their
historical origin. No discussion will be made of the burden
of proof imposed upon the taxpayer to prove the purchaser
was a non-resident of Indiana.7
Prior Order
1. The term "prior order" is a vague one and requires
definition. In order to be of value as a test, "prior order"
is best defined in terms of sales transactions. A point of
time from which the transaction is to be viewed must be
taken in order to attach any significance to the word "prior."
The "order" referred to, (apparently a request for delivery),
may conceivably be given by the buyer at any one of the
following times: (a) order before the contract of sale is
formed, i.e. an offer or acceptance, (b) order prior to ship-
ment, (c) order prior to delivery to the buyer.
(a) An initial reading of the Gross Income Tax Div.
memorandum might connote to the taxpayer that a "prior
in the same category as the sale of machinery and other tangible
personal property in relation to the application of interstate com-
merce immunity from tax, such securities transactions must there-
fore fall-within and meet the requirements and restrictions of the
same court decisions, regulations as are applicable to transactions
in machinery and other tangible personal property in interstate
commerce." Ind. Gross Income Tax Div., Departmental Memoran-
dum, January 24, 1947.
5. Admittedly no problem will arise where the Gross Income Tax Div.
finds all of its 'prerequisites' of tax immunity are present. The
problem arises where one or more of the "prerequisites" are ab-
sent. This analysis, therefore, will consider each 'prerequisite'
with reference to its individual validity.
6. Each 'prerequisite' used in the memorandum is necessarily vague
since no attempt was made to define the terms used. Unfortun-
ately each has varied and well established connotations in contract
and sales law.
7. It is sufficient here to comment that where sales are made on
large markets and exchanges, the problem of proof of purchase
by a non-resident is one of magnitude and great expense. In the
Freeman case the purchase by a non-resident was stipulated by
the State.
(Vol. 22
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order" meant an offer or acceptance by an out-of-state. buyer.
Consideration of the cases and fundamental contract prin-
ciples, however, compels a contrary conclusion. As a matter
of contract law, the delivery requirement, whether express
or implied, flows from the contract and it is immaterial which
contracting party first proposed the delivery term finally
agreed upon.8 The Freeman case indicates that the out-of-
state buyer need not propose this term to give the seller tax
immunity. In that case, the Indiana seller was the offeror.
The buyer's acceptance gave rise to the obligation to deliver
the securities. The Freeman case is also conclusive that there
is no requirement of an order previous to the formation of a
contract. The mere fact that the securities were offered at
a stated price rather than at market price did not result in
an offer by the buyer before the contract of sale was consum-
ated. Any concept of an "order" separate and distinct from
the contract for sale overlooks basic contract law.9 The con-
tract of sale must then be the "order" the state has reference
to. If this be true, it simply means that goods. are shipped
'pursuant to or in consunmnation of a contract.'
(b) The second possibility,. i.e. an order prior to ship-
ment across state lines can have no significance in view of the
Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford0 decision. To hold that
an order must be in existance prior to shipment would result
in taxibility where an Indiana seller ships goods out-of-state,
consigned to himself, intending to sell while the goods are in
transit or at destination.", The Gwin, White case, to the con-
trary, held this type transaction non-taxable.
(c) An order prior to delivery may be a valid require-
ment. No cases have been found wherein this type transac-
tion has been held tax immune under the Commerce Clause.
The dearth of cases of this nature in all probability results
8. As a matter of contract principles, acceptance of an offer auto-
matically results in the formation of a contract.
9. The contract of sale is complete upon acceptance at the Exchange.
Restatement, "Contracts" (1932) §64, 66, 74; Meyer, "Law of Stock
Brokers and Stock Exchanges" (1931) §28, p. 172.
10. 305 U.S. 434 (1939), (1939) 27 Calif. L. Rev. 336, (1939) 39 Col.
L. Rev. 864, (1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 969.
11. E.g., Indiana Mining Co. ships carload of coal on consignment to
itself in State X. Informs A that coal is available, A refuses.
Shipper notifies B in state of Y who accepts. Shipper reroutes
from State X or while car enroute, to state Y where B takes de-
livery.
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from the fact that sales by this method are exceedingly rare.
Very few concerns ship their product to a prospective cus-
tomer without negotiation of some sort. Perhaps the most
common example of this type transaction would be sales of
Christmas cards, ties and magazines by specialty vendors.
2. Thus, the term 'prior order' can only have signifance
in those few transactions where an Indiana seller delivers to
an out-of-state buyer without prior negotiation of any sort
and with the expectation of acceptance or return on the part
of the "prospective" buyer. This is clearly a limited field
of sales transactions.
3. The cases, historically, do not reveal the existence of a
prior order as an element in determining the privilege of a
state to tax a transaction with extra-state elements. The
concept arose as a result of the dictum of Chief Justice Taft
in the case of Sonneborn v. Cureton.1 2 However, in the case
of Wiloil v. Pennsylvania3 this was rejected and the tax im-
posed in spite of the clear existence of a prior order. Subse-
quent cases have been in accord and give no consideration to
this as an element of tax immunity.14 In none of the cases
involving Seller state transactions has the prior order con-
cept been relied upon by the court as a significant element in
tax determination. The Gross Income Tax Div. apparently
obtained this test from J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen15
where there were prior orders "in fact." However, the Su-
12. 262 U.S. 506 (1923); at 515, "Many of the sales by appellants
were made by them before the oil to fulfill the sales was sent to
Texas. These were properly treated by the state authorities as
exempt from state taxation. They were, in effect, contracts for
sale and delivery across state lines."
13. 294 U.S. 169 (1935), (1935) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 795. Taxing
state (Buyer & Seller state) placed tax on local seller of fuel-oil
which had been shipped from out-of-state directly to purchaser.
The Supreme Court sustained the tax on the ground that, "These
contracts did not reguire or necessarily involve transportation
across the state boundary . . . as interstate transportation was
not required or contemplated, it may be deemed incidental."
14. Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 141 F.(2d) 24 (C.C.A. 7th,
1944), rev'd. other grounds, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Dept. of Treas.
v. International Harvester Co., 322 U.S. 340 (1944) (Class C &
E sales); Holland Furnace Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 133 F.(2d)
212 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) cert. denied, 320 U.S. 746 (1943); Allied
Mills, Inc., v. Dept. of Treasury, 220 Ind. 340, 42 N.E.(2d) 34
(1942), aff'd. per curiam, 318 U.S. 740 (1943); Dept. of Treas. v.
Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941); McGoldrick v. Felt
and Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940).
15. 305 U.S. 307 (1938), 117 A.L.R. 429 (1938), (1939) 4 Mo. L.
Rev. 64.
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preme Court neither mentioned nor intimated this test in its
opinion.
Required Delivery
1. This 'prerequisite' originated in the Wiloil16 case to
avoid the "prior order" test stated in the dictum of the Son-
neboin case. This concept was flatly rejected in the later case
of McGoldrick v. Berwind White Coal Mining Co.17
2. It is doubtful that the term has any meaning beyond
the subsequent requirement considered, i.e. that delivery
across state lines was necessary and essential to the consum-
mation of the transaction.
Essential Delivery
1. In order to clarify and limit the scope of analysis of
this 'prerequisite' it should be pointed out that consideration
here will not be given to transactions where out-of-state de-
livery is specified solely for tax avasion purposes.18
2. Considering the possible interpretations of this 'pre-
requisite', a point of reference for the purpose of definition
must be established. The use of the term in its context in
the memorandum (i.e. delivery is essential to the consumma-
tion and completion of the transaction) connotes essentially
of delivery pursuant to the contract of sale.19  If this con--
16. See .n. 13 supra.
17. 309 U.S. 33 (1940). The sale of coal which moved from a mine
located in Pennsylvania to points of delivery in New York City
pursuant to contracts entered into in New York City held subject
to a city sales tax. Such tax does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce. At 53,54, "Respondent ... insists that a dis-
tinction is to be taken between a tax laid on sales made, without
previous contract, after the merchandise has crossed the state
boundary, and sales, the contracts for which when made contem-
plate or require the transportation of merchandise interstate to
the taxing state. Only the sales in the state of destination in the
latter class of cases, it is said, are protected from taxation by the
Commerce Clause .... But we think this distinction is without
the support of reason or authority . . .True, the distinction has
has the suppor of a satemen obiter in Sonneborn v. Cureton.
18. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390 (1930), (1930) 30
Col. L. Rev. 731, (1930) 16 Va.L.Rev. 848. For comment upon
the element of tax evasion see Note (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 270.
19. No duty to ship across state lines could arise short of contract,
i.e. mere offer or acceptance alone would not give rise to a duty
to ship. The reference point is then the shipping requirements
of the contract.
1947]
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cept relates to the contract requirements, consideration must
be given to the type of contract requirement to which the
term is directed. What may be "essential" delivery from
a contratual duty to deliver, may not be "essential" in fact
or for taxation. 20  What may be "essential" delivery from
the buyer's physical necessities, may not be "essential" for
the seller.2' The concluding possibility then is that "essen-
tial" refers to 'delivery pursuant to the place of delivery re-
quirement of the contract.' Here we reach the anomalous
result that the taxability of the seller is being established by
the buyer when he requires the seller to deliver at the buy-
er's place of business.
3. The "essential delivery" prerequisite is apparently a
perversion of the "required or contemplated" delivery test of
the Wiloil case which validated a tax imposed by the Buyer
state. Where the tax is levied by the Buyer state on a resi-
dent seller who chooses to deliver goods from out-of-state
plants rather than in-state plants, 22 the concept might have
meaning, if not significance. Consideration of the cases, how-
ever, indicates that the significant element is not that of
"essential delivery" (i.e. that the seller could have shipped
from within the taxing state) but is the 'local incident' of
delivery within the taxing state. The local incident of de-
livery seems to have been the favored 'incident' utilized by
20. E.g. the situation where the seller, due to fire, etc., finds it im-
possible to complete performance from his X state plant but does
so in the same form from his Y state plant. The contract of sale
specifically provides for delivery from X state plant. In the event
of breach of contract by either party, performance from X state
plant would not be "essential" insofar as to relieve either the
buyer of his obligation to perform [Restatement, "Contracts" (1932)
§§463, 464, 467] or the seller of his obligation to perform. [Booth
v. Spuyten Duyvie Rolling Mill Co., 60 N.Y. 487 (1875). Note(1921) 12 A.L.A. 1273,1281]. It is apparent that the term "essen-
tial" in the memorandum does not refer to this type situation.
21. Conceivably a hypothetical California buyer of the Freeman se-
curities could have come to Indiana to take delivery. Clearly
"essential" in terms of physical ability to perform is not the
intended definition of the term in the Gross Income Tax Division
memorandum.
22. E.g. the fact situation of the Allied Mills case (n. 14 supra)
appellee an Indiana corporation, engaged in the manufacture
and sale of live stock and poultry feeds, with factories in Indiana
and elsewhere. For business economies and not tax evasion, the
appellee divided Indiana into three geographical areas, one served
from Indiana Plant, the others from Illinois facilities. Held, ap-
pellee liable for tax upon all sales wherever delivery accepted in
Indiana regardless of whether delivery was made from Indiana or
elsewhere.
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the Supreme Court in sustaining taxation of interstate trans-
actions.23 Needless to say, these cases have no bearing upon
the problem here considered. The mere circumstance that
23. The recent cases establishing the states power to tax, under the
theory that Interstate Commerce must pay its way, have been con-
fined to those instances where the tax could be levied upon an
appropriately 'local incident.' Principal case at 279, " ... and
the tax [Berwind-White] was sustained because it was condi-
tioned upon a local activity delivery of goods ..... "; Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue 303 U.S. 250 (1938).- The Su-
preme Court has used delivery [Dept. of Treasury v. International
Harvester Co., 322 U.S. 340 (1944) (class D sales)], delivery
plus solicitation of contract of sale [Department of Treasury v.
International Harvester Co., supra) (class E sales)], and per-
formance of services [Dept. of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 252 (1941)]. Unloading and reloading, within
the taxing state, for out-of-state transshipment are insufficient
contact points to support the imposition of gross receipts tax leviea
on 'local' business [Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.,
67 S.Ct. 815 (U.S. 1947)] Cf. Rutledge, J., concurring in prin-
cipal case, 284-289 at 286: "Selection of a local incident for peg-
ging the tax has two functions relevant to determination of its
validity. One is to make plain that the state has sufficient factual
connections with the transaction to comply with due process re-
quirements. The other is to act as a safeguard, to some extent,
against repetition of the same or a similar tax by another state.
... But the Freeman case is one of the latte rtype, that is, where,
despite these connections (Indiana) there were equally close and
important ones in another state, New York; and therefore, as
the Adams case declared, the risk of multiple state taxation would
be incurred." Compare the use of 'local incident' theory with the
"Accumulation of Contracts Points" used in Barber v. Hughes,
63 N.E. (2d) 418 (Ind. 1945) in Conflict of Laws application.
Noted in (1946) 22 Ind. L. J. 78.
A further refinement of the 'local incident' and its effect upon
interstate sales occurs where an Indiana seller sells his product
to an out-of-state buyer f.o.b. seller's point. The validity of the
•imposition of the Indiana Gross Income Tax upon such a trans-
action depends upon the extent to which the Supreme Court is
willing to press its 'local incident' theory. Delivery within the
taxing seller state has been held sufficient for the imposition of
the tax (Dept. of Treasury v. International Harvester, supra).
However, in the Freeman case the court apparently was unwilling
to consider offer alone as a sufficient local incident to support
the tax. Where, between the two polar incidents, the passing of
title falls as a local incident is problematical. The case of Mc-
Leod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (1944), would indicate that the
passing of title was of sufficient import to support the tax. In
contrast, the multiple burden concept of the Adams case would
strike down the tax. Since "commerce among the several state is
a practical conception not drawn from witty diversities of the law of
sales" [Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507, 512 (1906)] the
fact that title passed prior to delivery should have no more ef-
ficacy in imposing taxes than does the retention of title for se-
curity purposes in C.O.D. consignments. Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co. v. Simms, 191 U.S. 441 (1903); accord, Dahnke-Walker Mill-
ing Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Lemke v. Farmer's
Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); Penna. R.R. v. Sonman Shaft Coal
Co., 242 U.S. 120 (1916).
1947]
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delivery was, in fact, taken in the taxing state with conse-
quent tax imposition does not a fortiori mean that the tax
could be imposed were delivery taken elsewhere, on the theory
that such delivery was not "essential." Cases involving de-
livery in the taxing state, therefore, do not lend validity to
the Gross Income Tax Div.'s 'prerequisite' of "essential de-
livery."
4. As was noted above, this concept is historically an adap-
tion of the "required delivery" concept of the Wiloil case
which was summarily rejected in the Berwind-White case.
It would appear that the Gross Income Tax Div. finds sup-
port for the adaptation of this concept in Dept. of Treas. v.
Allied Mills,24 where an Indiana seller, because of freight
rates and other considerations, delivered goods to Indiana
buyers from out-of-state plants although the deliveries could
have been made from Indiana plants. It is to be noted that
this case was affirmed per curiam on the strength of Mc-
Goldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. 25 and Felt & Tarrant Co.
v. Gallagher,26 the former being a companion case to Berwind-
White which overruled the "required delivery" concept of the
Wiloil case and the latter a use tax case. All of which would
indicate that delivery within the taxing state rather than "es-
sential delivery" was the basis of the court's affirmance. The
'local incident' of delivery as a test of tax immunity is sep-
arate and distinct from that considered here and the value
of the Allied Mills case as support for the 'prerequisite,' as
here used, is indeed questionable. In the Seller state cases
the 'prerequisite' of "essential delivery" has never been util-
ized, discussed or intimated by the courts.
Conclusion
The above analysis suggests that the Gross Income Tax
Div.'s test adds up to nothing more than this: tax immunity
is granted to all transactions in which delivery across state
lines occurs in the "ordinary course of business." In making
24. 220 Ind. 340, 42 N.E. (2d) 34 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S.
740 (1943) on basis of McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co.
309 U.S. 70 (1940).
25. McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., id. at 77, "Decision [here]
... is controlled by our decision in the Berwind-White Coal Min-
ing Co. case."
26. 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
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an additional division of factual situations into (1) normal
or usual course of business, and (2) isolated transactions,
further clarification of the problem may be made. The cases
considered above and found in the reports are those where
the transaction sought to be taxed was one of the normal
business activity of the taxpayer.27
The governing policy concerning "normal course of busi-
ness" transactions was established in 182428 on the premise
that the free flow of commerce is to be unimpaired by state
regulation.2 9  On the other hand, in the case of an "isolated"
sale which is not in the usual course of business"o the policy
arguments which limit the scope of permitted state regula-
tion are not so persuasive. For in the isolated sale situations,
the state action is directed toward a transaction collateral to
and not seriously affecting the predominate business of the
taxpayer.
Under this classification, the Gross Income Tax Div.'s pre-
requisites conceivably have application but only in the limited
field of isolated sales. Here, too, however, subject to possible
exceptions. In the "isolated" transaction, assuming the ex-
istence of an equal local market, the sale could be tested by
the application of the states 'prerequisites.' "The assumption,
however, of an equal local market indicates the exception
mentioned above. In those cases where the method of mar-
keting goods, through custom or necessity, has resulted in the
creation of a special market, interstate in character, corn-
27. This, in all probability results from a balancing of economic con-
siderations. If the type transaction sought to be taxed is the
taxpayer's normal business it may be economically feasibble to
contest the imposition of the tax. However, in the field of iso-
lated transactions it is probably cheaper to pay the tax than con-
test its applicability.
28. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (U.S. 1824).
29. Gross income taxes by state of seller which do not apportion the
assessment in accordance with either, (a) the taxes imposed by
the Buyer state [J. D. Adams v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). Cf.
Aponang Mfg. Co. v Stone, 190"Miss 805, 1 So. (2d) 763 (1941),
aff'd per curiam, 314 U.S. 577 (1941)] or (b) with the amount
of local activity [e.g. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 67
S. Ct. 444 (1947)] results in burden upon Interstate Commerce
[Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887); Crew Levick Co. v. Pa.
245 U.S. 292 (1917)] thereby invalidating the tax.
30. E.g. a manufacturing company purchases new machinery for man-
ufacturing purposes and sells the replaced machinery to a used
equipment dealer.
1947]
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posing a "uniform stream of commerce,"'- the commerce
clause here, too, extends its tax immunity. The N.Y. Stock
Exchange, Chicago Grain Exchange and Chicago Stock Yards
are illustrative of the "stream of commerce" marketing sug-
gested.
In the light of the foregoing it appears that the state's
'prerequisites' are significant and useful only in those few
instances where the sale is an isolated one and marketing
conditions are such that there is no application of the "stream
of commerce" theory. The problem of state taxation and the
commerce clause remains one for which no test or rule of
thumb of uniform application may be evolved. Each situation
must be judged upon its own facts and analogies drawn with
prior cases.3 2  The solution appears to be the adoption by
Indiana of a different type of taxation"3 or affirmative fed-
eral action in this field.3 4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
Plaintiff, a nineteen year old, was convicted of murder
in the first degree upon a plea of guilty without the advice
of counsel. The Supreme Court of Indiana held plaintiff had
31. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390 (1930); at 396,
"Dramatic circumstances, such as a great universal stream of
grain from the state of purchase to a market elsewhere, may
affect the legal conclusion by showing the manifest certainty
of the destination and exhibiting grounds of policy that are ab-
sent here." Accord, Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922);
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
32. " . . . The Indiana Gross Income Tax Division does not include
in the Regulations any specific rulings on taxability of receipts
derived from activities in interstate commerce, because of the
number and dissimilarity of situations. Therefore, each case
will be considered in the light of the individual circumstances
and the Division will determine whether or not immunity exists.
... )f CCH Ind. C. T. 10-574.
33. Freeman v. Hewit, 67 S. Ct. 274,278 (1946), suggesting the seller
state may tax; manufacturing [American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis,
250 U.S. 459 (1919)], licensing local business [Cheney Bros. Co.
v. Mass. 246 U.S. 147 (1918)], net income [U.S. Glue Co. v.
Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918)], property [Virginia v. Imperial
Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1934)].
34. Inter alia; McAllister, "Court, Congress and Trade Barriers"
(1940) 16 Ind. L.J. 144; Tax Institute Symposium, ."Tax Barriers
to Trade" (1940) p. 261; Browne, "Tax Coordination" (1945) 31
Corn. L.Q. 182; Comment, "The Commerce Clause and State
Franchise Taxes Affecting Interstate Commerce" (1940) 35 Ill.
L. Rev. 441.
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